tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7182111939035703155.post3206792202268066439..comments2024-03-18T20:55:07.632-07:00Comments on The Last Behaviorist: William Lane Craig on Animal SufferingTheLastBehavioristhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02766452615397498148noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7182111939035703155.post-48904476164109797932012-10-09T22:33:03.349-07:002012-10-09T22:33:03.349-07:00"However, I have never had anyone successfull...<b>"However, I have never had anyone successfully explain why we would ethically care about inflicting "suffering", but not ethically care about "pain". Given that the two words are fairly interchangeable in plain English, it is not clear to me which technical definition we would care about when facing a particular ethical conundrum."</b><br /><br />Yes this is the major problem I see with the claims of WLC and Michael Murray. Even if we grant the truth of every other part of his argument (that a PFC is necessary for self-awareness, that animals don't have self-awareness, etc), we're still left with this logical gulf between the premises and the proposed conclusion. Even if animals could only <i>experience</i> pain, then this would realistically make no functional or practical difference to the issues of animal welfare. <br /><br />Thanks for the suggestion on your book chapter - I saw your latest post about its release but haven't gotten around to checking it out. And that article looks incredibly interesting too, so I'll definitely give it a read!Mikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08801634278850835168noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7182111939035703155.post-61884971705219663742012-10-09T18:28:16.459-07:002012-10-09T18:28:16.459-07:00This is a pretty big problem, and it leads to all ...This is a pretty big problem, and it leads to all sorts of philosophical rabbit holes. I am familiar with the argument that suffering requires meta-awareness (a prior form of the argument, popular for decades was merely that it required "memory"). However, I have never had anyone successfully explain why we would ethically care about inflicting "suffering", but not ethically care about "pain". Given that the two words are fairly interchangeable in plain English, it is not clear to me which technical definition we would care about when facing a particular ethical conundrum. <br /><br />If you want a cool behaviorist spin on some of this, check out Nick Thompson's chapter in my book on Holt. It is Chapter 10: Interview with an Old New Realist. There is a bit about whether it is possible to design robots that feel pain, etc. Also... perhaps of relevance... a paper on a <i>very</i> radical behaviorist take on emotion and feelings just released <a href="http://www.behavior.org/resource.php?id=675" rel="nofollow">here</a> ;- )Eric Charleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17412168482569793996noreply@blogger.com